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Abstract—The wireless key generation is a potential way to
implement information theoretically secure key refreshment for
IoT devices. The state-of-the-art work on key generation mainly
utilizes the wireless local area network technologies. However,
they have not sufficiently considered the typical characteristics
of low power wide area network (LPWAN) such as lengthy
payloads, duty cycled transmission and reception, or limitations
for channel utilization. In this paper, we carried out a com-
prehensive experimental investigation on key generation applied
with LPWAN, taking LoRa/LoRaWAN as case studies. A key
generation protocol optimized for typical LPWAN applications
is proposed. According to the extensive evaluations with deep
in-building and long distance (up to 7 km) outdoor LoRaWAN
links, extraction of keys with high randomness becomes feasible.
Moreover, we study the achievable AES128 key refreshment
periods for different eavesdropper key disagreement rates. As
indicated by our measurement based evaluations, the AES128
key can be renewed every three hours with the proposed key
generation protocol and with the maximum LoRaWAN spreading
factor setting (longest range). A further interesting evaluation
result demonstrates that a secure key refreshment is still possible
even when the eavesdropper key disagreement rate is very close
to the rate of the legitimate users.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, low power wide area net-
works, physical layer security, key generation, LoRa/LoRaWAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Low power wide area network (LPWAN) optimizes long
range communication and low energy consumption and has
become a key enabler of many transformative internet of things
(IoT) applications in the areas of healthcare, smart cities,
manufacturing, and agriculture, etc. A number of LPWAN
techniques have been proposed within the past few years,
such as LoRaWAN, narrowband IoT (NB-IoT), Weighless
N/P and Sigfox [1]. These techniques operate typically with
relatively narrow signal bandwidths and give support for
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infrequent uplink signaling. They are well suited for simple
applications where small amounts of data transfer is sufficient.
Furthermore, the high communication ranges facilitate the
mobility and flexible employment of end devices.
The communication security between the LPWAN end
devices and the back-end systems is typically handled by the
symmetric encryption, e.g., by Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES). However, it is challenging to provide lightweight,
robust, cost efficient and secure key exchange for symmetric
encryption in IoT applications. Asymmetric cryptography is
used to distribute keys in conventional communication and
computer networks, which requires extensive computation
and is not suitable to the resource limited IoT devices. Key
pre-distribution, e.g., programming keys into to IoT devices
manually, is nowadays a popular option and utilized, e.g.
in LoRaWAN. However, such a method is inefficient and
potentially insecure. Firstly, key material stored in plain-text
could easily be compromised from a firmware dump [2].
Secondly, key refreshment by programming becomes a burden
in large-scale networks (100-1000 nodes). On the other hand,
as elaborated in [2] the compromised LoRaWAN secure keys
enable replay attacks and malicious end-devices, which are
classified as critical according to the risk assessment. By
mounting such attacks to IoT devices connected to a critical
infrastructure might lead to large scale data leakages or even
disasters [3].
Key generation from wireless channel is a promising tech-
nique to fulfill the aforementioned challenges [4], [5], where
two legitimate users extract key bits from their common wire-
less channel via bi-directional channel measurements. This
technique is shown to be information theoretically secure as
it exploits the unpredictable channel fading. Many theoretical
works of the subject, have concentrated, e.g. on the achievable
secret key capacity [6], on the artificial randomness injection
[7] or reconfigurable antennas [8]. In addition, key generation
is lightweight and energy efficient, which is very suitable for
low cost IoT devices [9]. Because of the above beneficial
features, key generation has attracted many research efforts in
terms of principles validation [10], protocol design [8], [11]–
[13], and prototyping [14], [15].
The research focus also lies on key generation applica-
tions with wireless technologies. The existing applications are
mainly designed with WiFi [10], [11] or ZigBee [9], [12],
[14]–[16]; both are limited in communications ranges, i.e.,
less than 100 meters. However, there are very few studies on
investigating full key generation implementations. Particularly,
key generation in LPWAN has not been comprehensively
investigated yet and the following challenges arise.
2• Channel reciprocity. LPWAN usually operates in long
range in the order of km, where the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) is quite low. There will be usually long receive
delay between uplink and downlink in LPWAN. The low
SNR and large sampling delay will impact correlation of
channel measurements [6], [17].
• Key refreshment. LPWAN runs at industrial, scientific and
medical (ISM) band and does not use channel detection
and sensing, thus it has to comply with duty cycle
regulations. This will limit the channel usage and thereof
increase the time required to generate a full set of keys.
• Static environment. Many IoT devices, e.g., smart meters,
are stationary and the channel is thus static or quasi static,
where the randomness is quite limited.
Although there are preliminary explorations utilizing LoRa
signaling for key generation [18], [19], the above issues have
not been fully studied yet. Xu et al. carried out extensive
experiments of secret key generation with LoRa signaling
for various wireless scenarios [18]. Zhang et al. presented
a differential value-based quantization algorithm to capture
the large variation of the received power [19], which is well
suited to extract keys from typical LoRa channel conditions.
However, neither of them considered the effects brought by
the LoRaWAN protocol.
Inspired by the above observation, this paper investigated
LPWAN-based key generation by using both LoRa and Lo-
RaWAN signaling as case studies. Our contributions are listed
as follows.
• We carry out an experimental study on the key generation
with large turn-around time latency (seconds) during the
channel probing stage. With LoRa-based measurement
setup, the key disagreement rate tends towards 50% for
a conventional key agreement as the turn-around time
grows due to the LoRa communication overhead. In the
sequel, an revised wireless secret key agreement protocol
is proposed, which overcomes challenges related to the
channel probing latency and the static channel conditions.
• The first LPWAN based key generation demonstration is
presented. Based on the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
LoRaWAN end devices and gateway, it is feasible to
generate keys securely under the LoRaWAN protocol,
application scenarios such as deep in-building penetration
and static long range outdoor communications (up to 7
km), and EU ISM band regional regulations (e.g., duty
cycle limitations).
• We quantify the key generation performance from the
application point of view. Specifically, we evaluate the
key generation rate, key disagreement rate and expected
AES128 key refreshment periods for various eavesdrop-
per statistics. According to our evaluations, periodic up-
dates of the cryptographic keys for AES128 are feasible,
even by considering strong eavesdropping attackers, wide
communication ranges and low communication rates.
Part of this paper was presented in [20], which investigated
LoRa-based key generation by studying the effects of LoRa
configurations. This paper significantly extends our previous
work by an enhanced key generation protocol and novel
experimental measurements and evaluations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The Section II
introduces preliminary knowledges of LoRa/LoRaWAN pro-
tocol, system model of wireless key agreement and reconfig-
urable antenna. Section III presents our novel key generation
protocol. Section IV and Section V give our design and re-
sults of the LoRa-based and LoRaWAN-based key generation,
respectively. Section VI concludes the paper with potential
directions for further research.
II. PRELIMINARY
This section introduces the preliminary knowledge, includ-
ing the LoRa physical layer and LoRaWAN media access con-
trol (MAC) layer, network structure and security, system model
of wireless key agreement, reconfigurable antenna concept,
and the challenges related to the wireless secret key generation
in LoRaWAN networks.
Strictly speaking, LoRa refers to the physical layer modu-
lation patented by the Semtech. LoRaWAN defines the higher
layers of the protocol stack, proposed by the LoRa Alliance.
It is worth noting that Symphony Link also operates above
LoRa physical layer [21] but LoRaWAN is the most popular
protocol with LoRa.
A. LoRa Physical Layer
LoRa physical layer is based on the chirp spread spectrum
(CSS) modulation, where phase shifted constant envelope
chirp signals convey the data symbols. CSS enables an energy
efficient long-range wireless communications. The commer-
cially available LoRa modems, the Semtech SX127x family,
allow seven discrete selections for the so called spreading
factor and three bandwidth among 125 kHz, 250 kHz and
500 kHz. The symbol duration is given as [22]
Tsym =
2SF
BW
, (1)
where SF and BW denote the spreading factor and bandwidth,
respectively. The air-time of the entire LoRa packet will be
proportional to the symbol duration. These parameters become
relevant from the key generation perspective since they have
a large impact on the duration of a single channel probing
event. Depending on the configuration of spreading factor and
bandwidth, the air-time of a LoRa packet varies from a few
milliseconds to a few seconds.
The popular SX127x LoRa transceivers offer two types of
channel and signal quality measures, namely RSSI and SNR.
The Semtech SX127x model provides direct RSSI sampling
and averaged RSSI per packet [23], which are denoted in this
paper as RSSIr and RSSIp, respectively.
The LoRaWAN gateways implement typically half-duplex
multi-channel and multi-spreading factor reception to sup-
port uplink communication from multiple LoRaWAN end
devices. The multi-channel transceivers include typically the
SX1257 RF front-end and the SX1301 baseband processor.
The different transceiver hardware architectures might turn out
unfavourable for the secret key generation due to different
analog RF components on the transmitter/receiver, which
cause asymmetry in the RSSI recordings.
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Fig. 2. Timing between uplink and downlink transmissions in LoRaWAN.
B. LoRaWAN MAC Layer and Communication Security
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the LoRaWAN network consists of
end devices, gateways and servers [24]. A packet forwarder
software at the gateway encapsulates LoRaWAN data together
with metadata (RSSI, SNR, timestamp) to an UDP/TCP data-
gram [25]. The datagram is forwarded to LoRaWAN network
server over 3G/4G or Ethernet link. The network server is
also responsible for the scheduling of the downlink packets,
i.e. acknowledgements or MAC command packets towards the
end devices via the gateway with the best connectivity.
LoRaWAN specification defines mandatory device Class A
and two optional device Classes B and C, based on their
different medium access methods.
• The Class A only allows the gateway to send downlink
to the end device when the gateway receives an uplink,
as shown in Fig. 2. After transmitting an uplink, the
end device will open the receive window after a Receive
Delay, which is 1s or 2s, to receive a downlink from the
gateway. Class A is best suited for low-power operation.
• The Class B introduces more reception time slots based
on synchronization beacon sent by the gateway, which
can support higher downlink data rates.
• The Class C applies no restriction for reception, which is
helpful for low latency communication.
The delayed reception windows in Class A and B increase
the channel probing latency, which may exceed the coherence
time of the channel and thereof increase key bit errors due to
asymmetric RSSI measurements.
Because LoRaWAN uses ALOHA as the MAC mechanism
without channel detection and sensing, regional ISM band
regulations may apply, which restrict the maximum LoRaWAN
air-time per device. For example, European Telecommunica-
tions Standards Institute (ETSI) restricts a 1% duty cycle for
the LoRaWAN frequency in Europe, namely 868 MHz [26].
(a)
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Fig. 3. (a) The schematic of the tunable reactive element. (b) A manufactured
reactive element. (c) A six-element ESPAR antenna controlled by an Arduino
platform.
As per the end device, it has to satisfy
Tpkt
Ts
< 1%, (2)
where Tpkt is the packet duration and Ts is the transmission
interval.
Communication security in LoRaWAN is established by the
symmetric AES cipher to provide payload confidentiality and
by CMAC-AES to implement message integrity checks. The
involved session keys can be programmed permanently onto
the nodes (activation by personalization (ABP)) or derived
while the node joins the network (over-the-air activation
(OTAA)). LoRaWAN specification 1.0 and 1.1 defines one and
two root keys, respectively. However, the specification does
not recommend any key distribution algorithms but leaves the
implementation to the user’s discretion. Passive key distribu-
tion might lead to vulnerabilities like device impersonation or
replay attacks, as elaborated in [27]. A secure key distribution
protocol for LoRaWAN is thus extremely desirable.
C. System Model of Wireless Key Agreement
Two legitimate users, namely Alice and Bob, generate
shared secret key out of their correlated channel measure-
ments. A passive eavesdropper, Eve, attempts to obtain mea-
surements correlated to those with Alice and/or Bob. Given
the channel observation X , Y and Z for Alice, Bob and
Eve, respectively, a theoretical upper bound for achievable key
generation rate is equal to the secret key capacity, given as
Ck = min[I(X;Y ), I(X;Y |Z)], (3)
4where I(·) denotes mutual information of two variables.
Hence, secret key generation becomes feasible given that
Ck > 0, which refers to situation where Eve’s information
on channel measurements does not exceed that of the legiti-
mate users. By applying wireless channel fading model, e.g.,
Rayleigh model, closed-form solutions to (3) can be obtained.
For detailed formulations and derivations of such solutions we
refer the reader to [6] and [28]. The important aspect, delivered
by the theoretical analysis, is that Ck becomes dependent on
the channel probing delay τ , channel probing rate T , channel
coherence time Tc and SNR at the legitimate users.
D. Challenges Related to Wireless Secret Key Generation in
LoRaWAN Networks
The fundamental differences between LoRaWAN and short-
range wireless networks (e.g. 802.11) in terms of physical
layer, MAC layer and use cases imply some additional hurdles
in terms of secret key agreement. Below we identify and
elaborate the three most important challenges.
1) Static Channel Conditions: Typical use cases of Lo-
RaWAN involve remote sensing applications, where gateways
and sensor nodes locate on fixed positions [29]. Hence, the
rapid channel variations due to the user movement, which is
the typical source of randomness in wireless key agreement,
are less likely in LoRaWAN scenarios. For many LoRaWAN
use cases, the coherence time Tc becomes large, which drives
Ck close to zero.
2) Lengthy Payloads and Delayed Receive Windows: As
described above, the LoRaWAN applies narrow-band CSS
signaling, which results in RF payload lengths of up to a
few seconds. Furthermore, as depicted in Fig. 1, the network
server is responsible for the scheduling of the downlink ACK
packets, additional communication and computation latency is
thus generated. In LoRaWAN Class-A standard this (unknown)
latency is solved by the delayed reception windows. These
design considerations place, however, hurdles on the channel
probing part of the wireless key generation. Ideally, the node
and the gateway would exchange short wireless packets within
Tc to ensure that the sensed channel properties are nearly
identical. However, as τ grows, the correlation between the
measurements decreases. Consequently, the lower the correla-
tion between X and Y , the lower Ck becomes.
3) Limited Channel Utilization: Because LoRaWAN oper-
ates at the ISM band and uses ALOHA protocol to access
the channel, it has to comply with the channel regulation. For
example, ETSI regulates the 1% duty cycle for the 868 MHz
band in Europe [26]. Hence, the constrains on T directly affect
the rate at which secret keys can be generated in LoRaWAN
networks.
The above mentioned challenges motivate us firstly to study
ways to improve the randomness of the channel conditions.
Furthermore, it is of our interest to investigate key genera-
tion methods which take account of fading scenarios, where
τ  Tc.
E. Reconfigurable Antenna as Randomness Source
Electrically steerable parasitic array of radiators (ESPAR)
type antenna is first included in the wireless secret key genera-
tion and experimentally validated for 802.15.4 communication
in [30], [31]. Such an antenna design allows for tuning antenna
radiation pattern by a fixed number of reactive elements,
which ultimately leads to increased variance in measured RSSI
traces. A theoretical analysis of reconfigurable antenna arrays
in wireless secret key agreement schemes is given in [8]. The
central piece of the work is the evaluation of the “secret key
bits” metric, given as
ISK = I(X,Y |Z), (4)
which represents the number of generated key bits per mea-
surement secure from the eavesdropper. Via numerical simula-
tions and experimental measurements, the authors were able to
show that ISK > 0 is achievable even despite the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers. Moreover it was shown that ISK can
be maximized by switching the reactive elements between two
impedance configurations.
Inspired by the presented results, a six-element ESPAR
antenna construction was built for 868 MHz. This construction
supports for switching between 5V and 0V bias voltage to
control the impedance of the reactive elements. The schematic,
the manufactured reactive elements and the ESPAR antenna
connected to the control unit (Arduino) and the LoRaWAN
modem are shown in Fig. 3 (a), (b) and (c), respectively. In
case of LoRaWAN network, the reconfigurable antenna can be
installed to the gateway and/or end devices in order to improve
key generation performance.
III. SECRET KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM
This section presents the steps to establish an effective secret
key generation, the attack model and figures of metrics (FoM).
A. Protocol
The complete key generation chain can be broken down
into elementary steps: 1) channel probing, 2) measurement
pre-selection, 3) measurement match, 4) pre-correction, 5)
quantization, 6) information reconciliation, and 7) privacy am-
plification, which are elaborated below. A more comprehensive
and detailed explanation of the algorithms and measurement
techniques can be found in [4].
1) Channel Probing: An end device communicates in a bi-
directional manner with the gateway. For each received uplink
and downlink packet the communication parties record RSSI,
SNR and the packet counters. As shown in Fig. 2, the sampling
delay between the uplink and downlink is
τ = Tpkt + Receive Delay. (5)
As specified in LoRaWAN Class A requirements, the down-
link can only occur 1s or 2s later after an uplink reception.
On the other hand, LoRa signaling does not have to delay
the message transmission so the downlink can be sent im-
mediately after an uplink packet, namely, τ = Tpkt. After a
packet is successfully received, the end device or the gateway
reconfigures the ESPAR antenna parameters randomly.
52) Measurement Pre-Selection: The gateway analyzes the
collected measurements and selects only those measurements
for which the perturbations in RSSI/SNR values stems mostly
from ESPAR antenna reconfigurations.
Firstly, the measurement set is divided into smaller subsets,
each with Ns samples. The empirical distribution function of
the ith subset can be calculated as Fi,Ns(x). The two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test is able to test the equality
of two probability distributions, which is performed for each
neighboring subset as
DNs = sup
x
|Fi,Ns(x)− Fi+1,Ns(x)|, (6)
where sup(·) is the supremum function. When the DNs is
above a selected threshold, these two sets can be deemed to
follow the same distribution and will be selected for further
processing.
3) Measurement Match: The CSS modulation utilized in
LoRaWAN leads to long packet durations and ultimately to
packet collisions as only a limited number of ISM bands are
available for the end user [32]. Therefore it shall be expected
that a continuous channel probing for each uplink/downlink
packet is not possible and a measurement match between the
end device and the gateway has to be accomplished before the
key extraction, which can be completed as follows.
• The gateway sends the first and last uplink packet number
of the pre-selected measurements to the end device.
• The end device examines the corresponding downlink
packet numbers and determines subsets of continuous
measurements, i.e. set of measurements without packet
drops, which are communicated back to the gateway.
Now both the end device and gateway are informed about the
pre-selection and the available measurements.
4) Pre-Correction: The synchronized measurements are
corrected by discrete cosine transform (DCT), which is per-
formed block-wise for the measured values as
X(k) =
N−1∑
n=0
x(n) cos
( pi
N
(n+ 0.5)k
)
, (7)
where N denotes the block size, x(n) denotes the measured
value and the X(k) denotes the transformed measured val-
ues. Subsequently, as a precorrection step, those frequency
components of DCT, which cause significant error to key bit
quantization can be removed as presented in [16]. This step
is helpful to overcome bit-errors due to low SNR LoRaWAN
signal conditions.
5) Quantization: The obtained measurements are converted
into key bits k(n) by
k(n) =

0 x(n) > gb
drop −gb < x(n) < gb
1 x(n) < −gb
, (8)
where x(n) denotes a single entity of a normalized set of
measured values, and the gb is the guard-band value. Hence,
the measured value between negative and positive guard-
band tolerance values will not be involved during the further
steps. The packet numbers of the dropped measurements are
communicated from the end device towards the gateway to
ensure the synchronicity of the quantized key bits.
6) Reconciliation: Due to imperfect measurements, the
quantized key bits contain bit errors even after pre-correction.
The remaining key errors have to be corrected bitwise with
traditional information reconciliation protocols. The secure
sketch algorithm with BCH encoding was chosen as it is
suitable for low resource LoRaWAN devices. Specifically, the
BCH (127, 22) were chosen, which can correct up to 23 bits
out of 127 key bits.
7) Privacy Amplification: According to the passive at-
tacker model, the eavesdropper can follow the reconciliation
communication between Alice and Bob, and hence utilize
the information to correct her key sequence as well. Since
this might in the worst case lead to exposure of the secret
key, the final step in the key generation protocol is privacy
amplification. The goal of this step is to remove the potentially
leaked information during the reconciliation step. This paper
applies the SHA256 hash function to implement the privacy
amplification, which ultimately produces the final secret key.
B. Attacker Model
Following the lines of the many state-of-the-art work [4],
this paper utilizes a passive eavesdropper model to verify
the security of the secret key generation model. The attacker
possesses clones of the LoRa transceivers, the end-device
firmware and the current session keys of the LoRaWAN
traffic. Hence, from the point of view of attackers, all the
necessary communication, e.g., reconciliation, is considered
to be communicated in plain-text.
C. Figures of Merit
A selection of performance metrics shall be utilized in order
to investigate the key generation effects. Such FoM deliver
ultimately relevant information on reliability and practicality
of the proposed key generation scheme.
The cross correlation coefficient provides a way to assess
the symmetry of the wireless channel, which is defined as
ρ =
E[(X − µx)(Y − µy)]
σxσy
, (9)
where E[·] denotes the expectation function, µx and σx repre-
sent mean of a random variable X and standard deviation of
X , respectively. A ρ ∼ 1 means that the bi-directional wireless
channel conditions are nearly independent on the direction
of the communication, i.e. they are reciprocal. Otherwise for
ρ  1 indicates channel asymmetry, which might stem from
channel dynamics or from different transceiver hardware on
the gateway and end devices.
From applications point of view, an important factor is the
rate that secret key bits can be produced. The number of key
bits per measurement (KPM) is adopted, which is defined as
KPM =
NRSSI
NKEY
, (10)
where NRSSI and NKEY denote the number of RSSI measure-
ments and the number of quantized key bits, respectively.
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Fig. 4. (a) LoRa equipment. (b) Measurement setup for LoRa Signaling in
Scenario II
The key disagreement rate (KDR) quantifies rate of different
bits at the keying parties, given as
KDR =
NERR
NKEY
, (11)
where NERR denotes the number of erroneous key bits within
the quantized key bit stream. It determines the success of the
key generation, the required key correction capacity during
reconciliation and the rate of the leaked key bits.
Finally, to prevent key guessing attacks the quantized key
material shall have properties close to a key stream produced
by a true random number generator (TRNG). For this purpose
a popular tool-set is the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) test suite [33], which includes several
statistical randomness tests for binary sets. The outcomes of
each test are reported by a P-Value which denotes the level
of confidence, where a value above 1% indicates a strong
evidence that the quantized keys stem from a TRNG.
As discussed in [34], the NIST tests should be applied to
the key sequence before privacy amplification. This is because
the output of the hash function is usually random, which may
pass the tests. However, when the input is not random, it will
result in a dictionary attack. Therefore, in order to produce a
secure and random key, we need to guarantee the quantized
key, before the privacy amplification, should be random.
IV. LORA-BASED KEY GENERATION
This section will present key generation with LoRa sig-
naling, without the restriction of the delay between uplink
and downlink. This includes a comprehensive characterization
of the LoRa physical layer in the light of key generation.
Aspects such as available channel quality indicators and effects
of LoRa modulation to the channel measurements will be
covered.
A. Measurement Setup
Fig. 4 depicts the hardware components, which consist of
two units, a Raspberry Pi 3B+ and a SX1276RF1JAS LoRa
evaluation board. The LoRa parameters of the experimental
setup apply as given in Table I, unless otherwise specified.
On the software side, the Libelium LoRaWAN Stack was
modified to create bi-directional LoRa links [35]. The primary
modification to the original software implementation include:
• Optimization of the turn-around time between RX and
TX;
• Storage of the packet counters and measured values;
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR LORA SCENARIOS
Parameter Value
Center frequency 865.2 MHz
Payload size 4 bytes
Bandwidth 125 kHz
Spreading factor 7
Coding rate 4/5
Transmission power 20 dBm
• Direct sampling of instantaneous RSSI values during the
reception.
The packet counter values were later utilized to determine
the package drops so that the secret key bits could be
calculated from correctly aligned measurements. Finally, the
RSSIr values were calculated by taking an average of 100
instantaneous RSSI values collected from the preamble part of
the LoRa signal; the RSSIp is read directly from the packet
RSSI register.
This section adopted only part of the steps in Section III,
namely steps: 1), 3) and 5), because the goal at this point is
to quantify the LoRa physical layer effects on the quantized
raw key material.
B. Results
1) Scenario I: Symmetry of LoRa Payloads: The CSS mod-
ulation leads to wireless waveforms with a constant envelope
when the payload is the same. Hence, it shall be expected that
the instantaneous RSSI values are nearly constant for packets
with identical payload. However, as illustrated in Fig. 5, those
values show a clear pattern of LoRa modulation, which is
likely a result of filtering in analog and/or in digital domain
inside the SX127x modem. Identical payloads leads to a very
consistent RSSI but random payload results in asymmetric
RSSI recordings. Thus, the computation of the RSSIr shall be
performed over instantaneous RSSI values collected from the
symmetrical part of the LoRa packets such as the preamble.
The encrypted payload part will vary from packet to packet,
which subsequently causes asymmetric RSSIr measurements.
2) Scenario II: LoRa Parameters: The selection of the
spreading factor and bandwidth has a large impact to the
turn-around time, which potentially increases the asymmetry
in RSSI measurements. The order of the impact of the dif-
ferent LoRa parameters was studied by de-tuning one of the
end-device antennas in a controllable manner. As shown in
Fig. 4(b), a two-sided printed circuit board was mounted on a
stepper motor, placed a few centimeters from the antenna. The
antenna and thereof wireless channel characteristics can be
controlled, which allows for reproducible measurements. With
this setup the following parameter combinations were consid-
ered: SF = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}, BW = {125, 250, 500} kHz,
and transmission power Pt = {20, 0} dBm. The stepper motor
was configured to produce approximately 30 revolutions per
minute.
The effects of the constantly changing channel conditions on
the key generation performance can be seen in the Fig. 6. As
shown in Figs. 6 (a), (d), and (b), (e), the attained correlation
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Fig. 5. RSSIr values from a single LoRa packet with (a) identical payloads
and (b) random payloads.
coefficients and KDRs are directly proportional to the LoRa
packet duration. Since the channel varies with a constant
rate, when SF ≥ 10 the duration of the channel probing
exceeds the channel coherence time, which ultimately leads to
asymmetric measurements and higher KDR. Secondly, RSSIr
measurements show better KPM and KDR over RSSIp for
several considered parameter combinations. As depicted in
Fig. 6 (e), RSSIr shows superior performance also for low
transmission signal power. Due to the direct sampling of a
small part of the LoRa packet and averaging, the measurement
noise can be suppressed, which leads to a lower KDR.
V. LORAWAN-BASED KEY GENERATION
This section delivers the performance evaluations on secret
key generation optimized for long distance LoRaWAN links.
The considered wireless measurements are conducted for
typical use cases of LoRaWAN Class A and the evaluation
results thus illustrate real world key generation performance
for duty cycled ultra-low power operation.
A. Measurement Setup
A LoRaWAN gateway was established with a Raspberry Pi
3+ and an iC880a multi-channel LoRa modem, which is based
on Semtech SX1257 RF front-end and SX1301 baseband pro-
cessor. The packet forwarder software carries out redirection of
the uplink and downlink between LoRaWAN end devices and
the network and application servers [25]. The packet forwarder
was modified to extract the RSSI and the SNR values of
the uplink packets. The LoRaWAN end devices are the same
hardware components as the LoRa end devices presented in
Section IV-A. The LMIC 1.6 stack was adopted [36] and
the firmware was modified in order to implement simple
confirmed Class A LoRaWAN communication and measure
RSSIr during the two downlink RX windows. In order to
optimize key generation for LoRaWAN, the complete key
generation chain including steps 1)-7) presented in Section III
was adopted.
B. Results
1) Scenario III: Deep In-Building Penetration: The first
set of measurements were obtained from a non-line-of-sight
wireless link, where the end device and the gateway were
located on the 2nd and 5th floor inside an office building,
respectively. During 12 hours period 6750 measurements were
collected with SF = 12, BW = 125 kHz and the uplink
center frequency of 868.1 MHz. The reconfigurable ESPAR
antenna was mounted on the gateway side to improve the
nearly static communication scenario. The packet forwarder
software was modified to update the antenna parameters after
each transmitted downlink packet.
During the first step the pre-selection of the RSSI values
was accomplished by the KS test method, where Ns = 450
and the threshold value was set to 0.5. As shown in Fig. 7, the
measured trace contains sub-sets of RSSI values (highlighted
by red) for which the statistical distributions are nearly equal.
On the other hand the sub-sets for which KL test tends towards
zero (depicted by blue) indicate random perturbations to RSSI
for which the statistical properties change over time and hence,
those sub-sets contain randomness from the ESPAR antennas
and the dynamics of the wireless channel.
The evaluation results for KDR, KPM and NIST random-
ness tests are listed for four distinct key generation settings in
Table II. Firstly, by comparing key generation performance
for RSSI values without and with KS test preselection, it
can be observed that KDR decreases from 29% down to
18%, respectively. An additional improvement to the key
agreement performance is provided by the DCT processing
of the RSSI values before the quantization. As it turns out,
randomized selection of the ESPAR antenna configurations
might produce repetitive bit patterns, which makes subsequent
1-bit quantization based key generation more vulnerable to
dictionary attacks. This property is visible from the NIST test
results in Table II, where four out of eight tests fail for the case
without DCT. Therefore, the transformation by the DCT acts
here as a whitening operation, which reduces the bit pattern
repetitions and enables key generation close to TRNG.
2) Scenario IV: Long Distance Outdoor Communication:
A line-of-sight LoRaWAN link in suburban environment over
a distance of approximately 7 km was considered, which is
depicted in Fig. 8. The gateway monopole antenna is mounted
on the balcony of a five store office building and the end
device with the ESPAR antenna is placed on a roof of a car,
which remained stationary over the measurement period of
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Fig. 6. LoRa signaling based measurement results of Scenario II, where (a)-(c) and (d)-(f) show correlation, KDR and KPM for high & low signal levels,
respectively.
TABLE II
LORAWAN KEY GENERATION PERFORMANCE WITH DIFFERENT SCENARIOS AND SETUPS
Scenario III Scenario IV
Environment Indoor Indoor Indoor Indoor Outdoor Outdoor
Setup Guard-band 0.125,w/ KS, w/ DCT
Guard-band 0.125,
w/ KS, w/o DCT
Guard-band 0.125,
w/o KS, w/ DCT
Guard-band 0.125,
w/o KS, w/o DCT
Guard-band 0.25,
w/o KS, w/ DCT
Guard-band 0.25,
w/o KS, w/o DCT
KDR 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.21
KPM 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.94 0.7 0.74
Monobit 0.81 0 0.53 0 0.96 0
Block frequency 0.65 0 0.98 0 0.8 0
Runs 0.66 0 0.77 0 0.84 0.28
Longest Runs 0.21 0.3 0.85 0.05 0.25 0.27
Frequency 0.42 0.44 0.6 0 0.33 0.5
Serial 0.68 0 0.4 0 0.26 0
Approximate
entropy 0.93 0 0.53 0 0.53 0
Cumulative
Sums 0.84 0 0.76 0 0.96 0
3 hours. The same LoRaWAN parameters were selected as
in Scenario III. Due to the RF signal attenuation along the
given range in combination with the ESPAR antenna detuning,
approximately 50% of the SNR measurements were negative.
Hence, the SNR was chosen over RSSI as the randomness
source in this scenario.
For the obtained measurements the KS tests were above
the tolerance value of 0.5, and thus the entire measurement
set was selected for the key generation. Similarly to the
Scenario III, the positive effect of the DCT to reduce the
predictability of the generated keys is visible in Table II.
Finally the obtained performance metrics are close to the
scenario III which confirms the efficiency of the proposed
methods for secret key generation over very long distances.
3) Scenario V: Passive Eavesdropping: This scenario eval-
uated the attacker statistics on the leaked raw key material
(before and after error correction). This scenario is extended
from Scenario IV with an attacker end device, which was
equipped with a 868 MHz monopole antenna placed approx-
imately 5 cm from the legitimate node equipped with an
ESPAR antenna, which is much smaller than the wavelength
(λ = cfc =
3∗108
868∗106 = 34.6 cm.) The attacker was configured
for the continuous reception of the downlink transmission and
afterwards the attacker and the legitimate measurements were
9Fig. 7. Illustration of RSSI values selected by the KS pre-selection method.
synchronized based on the packet counter values.
As it turns out, the KDR for eavesdropper’s raw key material
becomes near 50%, which indicates the increased security
provided by the ESPAR antenna. The large KDR despite of a
close distance and equal LoRaWAN transceiver hardware can
be explained by the variations in the antenna characteristics.
C. Key Refreshment in LoRaWAN Class A Device
The ultimate goal of the secret key agreement in LoRaWAN
networks is to produce 128 key bits in order to enable
key refreshment for the AES encryption/decryption. This is
accomplished by the privacy amplification step, where a longer
key bit stream is converted to a shorter one via hash function.
The number of measurements required to generate secure key
bits between Alice and Bob is dependent firstly on the selected
quantization algorithm and secondly on the eavesdropper
statistics. Logically, the more key bits the eavesdropper can
determine by her measurements, the more measurement (bits)
Alice and Bob have to collect (extract), in order to arrive at
an amount of bits out of which at least 128 are unknown to
eavesdroppers. Assuming that exact statistics are available, the
minimum number of quantized key bits to be extracted become
nkeys =
128
KDReve −KDRab , (12)
where KDRab denotes the KDR between Alice and Bob.
Additionally KDReve > KDRab shall hold. Hence, the total
amount of measurements required is
nmeas =
nkeys
KPM
. (13)
At next, the time required per AES128 key can by estimated
as
TAES = nmeasTs. (14)
Finally, the frequency for the key refreshment, given as
AES128 per time unit (hours/days), becomes
fAES =
δt
TAES
, (15)
TABLE III
COMPARISON WITH THE STATE-OF-THE-ART WORK
Xu et al. [18] Zhang et al. [19] This work
Deep In-building
Penetration No Yes Yes
Outdoor range 4 km 500 m 7 km
Spreading Factor 7 7 12
Bandwidth 500 125 125
Transceivers 2xSX1276 2xSX1276
SX1276 and
SX1301 &
SX1257)
Antennas Monopole Monopole ESPAR andMonopole
Signaling LoRa LoRa LoRaWAN
Communication
scenarios
Dynamic and
Static Dynamic Static
Quantization
algorithm Multi-bit Single-bit Single-bit
where δt denotes a unit of time.
An example TAES estimations for various spreading factor
are illustrated in Fig. 9(a) with ETSI duty cycle limitations
(1%) and in Fig. 9(b) without duty cycle limitations. The fol-
lowing parameters hold: LoRaWAN payload size is 32 bytes,
SF = 12, KPM = 70%, KDRab = 17%, 20% < KDReve <
50%. The Ts was calculated based on the LoRaWAN airtime
calculator [37]. The most important observation from the
Figs. 9(a) and 9(b) is that a regular AES128 key refreshment
is feasible by the presented key generation method. In the case
of the longest air-time (SF = 12), KDReve = 33% and no duty
cycle restriction, a new key can be generated approximately
every three hours (ca. eight keys per day). With 1% duty cycle
limitation the key refreshment period becomes approximately
three days (ca. 10 keys per month). The robustness against
eavesdropping attacks can be improved by assuming more
conservative expectation for KDReve.
D. Implications on LoRaWAN Security and Communication
In terms of application security in LoRaWAN, the im-
portance of key refreshment is especially relevant for the
ABP network join procedure, where pre-programmed AppKey
and NwkKey are applied directly for AES128 encryption.
On the other hand, OTAA join procedure utilizes those keys
for deriving session keys. However, as soon as an attacker
possesses the DevNonce, JoinNonce and AppKey, she will
be able to calculate session keys, and thus reveal the entire
captured uplink and downlink data. By increasing the AppKey
(and NwkKey) refreshment periods, the forward security will
be improved as the compromise of a single key does not result
in leakage of the entire communicated data.
By comparing the state-of-the-art works on LPWAN based
key generation given in Table III, it becomes clear that
our work provides the best compatibility for the existing
LoRaWAN networks. Specifically, by supporting high SF
settings and typical LoRaWAN Gateway hardware (SX1301
multichannel transceiver) opens up new possibilities to imple-
ment secret key agreement in large scale networks. From the
practical implementation point of view, the proposed secret
key agreement protocol can be embedded next to the re-join
procedure, to reset both the master keys and the session keys.
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8. Outdoor LoRaWAN scenario. (a) Line-of-sight wireless link. (b) Antenna of Alice mounted on the balcony of a 5th floor of an office building. (c)
ESPAR antenna of Bob mounted on the roof of a car.
(a) (b)
Fig. 9. Estimated time required to produce an AES128 key vs. Eve’s KDR given the different spreading factor settings. (a) the EU868 band duty cycle
limitations for LoRaWAN communication. (b) without duty cycle limitations
Similar to forward security, the physical layer key agreement
also provides protection against quantum computer attacks.
Without information on the RSSI measurements (and with
sufficient key lengths), the brute-force attacks shall remain
infeasible. According to NIST recommendations [38] the cryp-
toperiod, i.e., the period of time over which the cryptographic
key is in utilization, for a symmetric master key shall be one
year. Hence it can be assumed that the key agreement even
with asynchronous non-frequent LoRaWAN uplink communi-
cation can support for this recommendation.
As mentioned in Section III, the key agreement utilizes
the existing transmissions to arrive at the required RSSI
measurements. Hence, the channel probing part of the protocol
does not introduce additional communication overhead. On
the other hand, the parts ”Measurement Match” and ”Rec-
onciliation” necessitate exchange of LoRaWAN packets to
synchronize the measurements and to perform error correction.
Depending on the amount of dropped uplink/downlink packets
and nmeas, a slight increase to the communication overhead
shall be expected. As an example: In the scenario given in
previous subsection, the generation of a single AES128 key
demands ca. 130-150 bytes to be exchanged between the end-
device and the gateway. Hence, a communication overhead
of ca. five (32 byte) LoRaWAN packets shall be added.
Nevertheless, this overhead is marginal when compared with
the entire LoRaWAN packet exchange during the normal end-
device operation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a wireless key generation method
tailored for LoRa and LoRaWAN Class A devices. We have
carried out extensive experiments to evaluate key generation
performance with different LoRa physical layer configurations
(spreading factor and bandwidth). We have also performed
experiments for LoRaWAN-based key generation with scenar-
ios of deep in-building penetration and line-of-sight outdoor
communication up to 7 km. An ESPAR antenna was designed
to tackle the static channel conditions, which is common in
many IoT scenarios. The results demonstrated that a regular
refreshment of the AES128 key can be achieved even for
challenging SNR conditions (SNR < 0) or for long channel
probing signals. The presented key generation chain shall
be applicable for other long range communication protocols
as well. The future work will be targeted at system level
performance evaluations for large-scale LoRaWAN networks
and on ultra-low power implementations of the presented
algorithms.
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